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ABSTRACT. During the late 1980s, in the wake of the end of cold war and 
shrinking defense budget, the Delegation General for Armaments (DGA), the 
French government agency that is responsible for the contracting and 
management of all weapon programs, implemented a wide range of 
restructuring efforts to reform French defense industry.  For instance, one 
notable change was to migrate from cost-plus contracts to fixed-price 
contracts to control the then prevalent cost overruns. Today, nearly all 
French weapon procurement contracts are fixed-price based.  Research has 
found that while in France as elsewhere cost overruns still occur, such 
problem tends to be relatively modest in scope. Specifically, Kapstein and 
Oudot (2009) document that French cost overrun is normally within the 5-10 
percent range as opposed to an average 26 percent overrun in the U.S. 
 
Given the French experience has in general been perceived to be successful 
(OTA Background Paper 1992, Kapstein 2009), what can the U.S. learn from 
French lessons? Today the U.S. confronts a very similar and difficult cost 
overrun problem that led DGA in the late 1980s to the reform of the system. 
We argue that while U.S. can certainly learn useful lessons from the French 
experience, significant differences nevertheless exist between the two 
countries in the context of the political and economical environment.  These 
institutional differences indicate that a “copy and paste” approach will not 
work in U.S.  Rather, an individual based assessment of the French 
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After WWII, the U.S. shifted away from its near-exclusive wartime 
reliance on fixed-price contracts for weapon procurement to cost-plus 
contracts, especially for the early development stage. The rationale 
was that as the modern weapons became more complex and 
uncertainty about the cost was so high that it was almost impossible 
to come up with a good cost estimate ex ante. Cost-plus contracts 
were introduced to effectively shift risks from the contractors’ 
shoulders to the government. In late 1940s, France followed suit and 
widely adopted cost-plus contracts in its defense acquisition practice. 
However, the benefit of risk-sharing associated with cost-plus 
contracts came with a price, i.e., the large and prevalent cost-
overruns. The problem in France became so big that in late 1980s 
the DGA decided that it could no longer rely on cost-plus contracts. A 
return to fixed-price contracts was pushed by the DGA and as a result, 
today fixed-price contracts are by far the dominant contracting tool in 
the French defense procurement system. 
At present, large cost overruns in the U.S. has led to widespread 
criticisms from various sources in Congress, the Administration, and 
taxpayers (GAO report 2009, O’Hanlon 2009, The Presidential 
Memorandum, March 4, 2009). Struggling for solutions, some 
individuals might be tempted to call for adoption of the French 
solution to address a similar problem in U.S. today.  However, a 
number of fundamental institutional differences exist between the 
U.S. and France, which include but are not limited to the following: 
(a) The U.S. defense industry belongs to private sector while 
nearly four-fifths of the French defense industry is controlled by the 
state and broadly managed by the government. It is not unusual that 
the chairman of a “national champion” 
(b) 2 defense firm is named by the President on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense. 
                                                          
2 Due to the small size of the French domestic arms market, French 
government has encouraged industry consolidation that has resulted in 
usually only one firm, a “national champion”, at the prime-contract level in a 
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Also, government representatives frequently sit on the company’s 
board of directors.  
 
(c) The relative power between the legislative branch and the 
executive branch of the government is different in France and the U.S. 
While the U.S. Congress is powerful in almost all elements of the 
major defense weapon systems, the French Parliament (National 
Assembly and Senate) exert much less influence. Specifically, the 
National Assembly has little ability to intervene in specific programs 
other than voting on a multi-annual package of defense expenditures. 
 
(d) The U.S. has a long and strong tradition of believing in the 
free-market economy and competition.  Governmental involvement 
and intervention into the private sector is viewed by individuals to be 
counter-productive and inefficient. On the contrary, the nature of 
French state encourages a cozy relationship between the French 
government and the defense industry.  In such a cooperative 
environment, disputes are worked out in secret and the approach is 
“top-down” with limited oversight from the public or Parliament. 
 
(e) In contrast to the U.S., where each individual armed service 
has its own contracting agency, France has one single, centralized, 
prestigious, and powerful  government agency, the DGA,  in charge of 
all the contracting and management of all weapon programs. The 
director of the DGA directly reports to the Minister of Defense and 
oversees a staff of about 54,000 people. As a powerful and 
prestigious organization, DGA is able to attract the best scientific and 
engineering talent. As a matter of fact, DGA’s top engineers and 
scientists, called “armament engineers”, graduated almost 
exclusively from the elite schools. While it is indeed true that French 
people take pride in working for the DGA, similar statement cannot be 
made in the United States. Lamm and Reed (2009) document that 
about 25 percent of the civilian workforce in the DoD and service 
contracting agencies do not have a bachelor’s degree.  
                                                                                                                                  
specific sector. Examples include Dassault Aviation for fighter aircraft and 
Aerospatiale for helicopters.  
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To summarize, the above institutional differences need to be taken 
into consideration when researchers try to make serious and 




THE FRENCH “SUCCESS” FACTORS 
 
Prior Study (Kapstein and Oudot, 2009) shows that among many 
factors contributing to the French success, the following three are 
notably instrumental:  
(1) The budget constraints in late 1980s forced DGA to take steps to 
focus on cost reductions and prevent future cost overruns. The harsh 
budgetary realities gave project managers strong incentives to 
improve efficiency.  
(2) The technical capacity that DGA possessed led to both precise ex 
ante cost and risk assessment and effective ex post project 
monitoring. This technical capacity and the resulting assessments 
and monitoring reduced the information asymmetry between the DGA 
and the contractors, serving as a major building block of French 
defense acquisition system. 
(3) Over time, DGA has developed a “responsibility principle” as a 
major element of the fixed-price contracting environment. The 
principle implies that those who are responsible for cost overruns, 
whether the government or the contractor, must bear the extra cost in 
the case of a cost overrun and renegotiation. 
 
 
ON WHAT WE CAN’T LEARN OR IS HARD TO MIMIC 
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The nature of the French state is very different from that of the U.S. 
Those differences, often hard to change, will impose limit in 
mimicking French success.  
a) A French-style full-spectrum migration from cost-plus 
contracts to fixed-plus contracts is inappropriate in U.S. due to the 
fundamental differences between the U.S. and French defense 
acquisition systems.  
The French success is a success of the system rather than a 
particular contract type. Numerous factors, including many 
institutional reasons, were necessary to make fixed-price contracts in 
France a success. The most important contributing factor to French 
success is not the adoption of fixed-price contracts. Rather, it is little 
information asymmetry between the defense industry and the French 
government that makes the fixed-price contracts and the whole 
system work.   
If information asymmetry is not a major concern, we would agree that 
fixed-price contracts should be preferred. Unfortunately, this is not 
the case in the U.S. for two reasons: 1) a typical U.S. weapon program 
by far dominates a typical French weapon program in terms of degree 
of scale and complexity. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, information 
asymmetry is more serious in the U.S. 2) U.S. acquisition workforce as 
a whole does not enjoy the intellectual capacity that enables the 
government to effectively reduce information asymmetry as does 
their French counterpart. 
In the presence of significant information asymmetry, the mindset 
that fixed-price contracts are more cost efficient than cost-plus 
contracts becomes problematic. The fundamental issue is that the 
government does not possess necessary information to form a 
reasonable cost estimate for major weapon programs. Hence the 
government ultimately has to rely on the more informed contractor 
(often times single-sourced) to provide a cost estimate as the basis 
for contract price. 
         If fixed-price contracts are enforced, we would expect two 
impacts on the contractors’ incentives. First, risk-averse contractors 
will demand a “risk premium” in submitting their cost estimate. This 
rational behavior, while not an issue ethically, leads to the taxpayers’ 
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extra transfer to the contractors because this payment is 
unnecessary should the risk-neutral government chooses to bear the 
risk (as the government often does in a cost-plus contract). 
Consequently, a deadweight welfare loss is incurred. Secondly, an 
opportunistic contractor will seek additional “information rents” due 
to information asymmetry. The key observation is that information 
asymmetry makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for the 
government to dispute the inflated cost estimate. We therefore 
conclude that fixed-price contracts in the absence of information 
symmetry and market competition will likely lead to a higher 
government payment than do cost-plus contracts. 
b) While the budget constraint will certainly become more 
restrictive in U.S., the impact on contrators’ choice is not clear. 
Hence, it is questionable to use a harsh budget constraint to deliver 
cost efficiency. 
Extra caution should be exercised in advocating use of artificial and 
extra hard budget constraints to promote cost efficiency. If forced into 
a “take it or leave it” game, the risk-averse and profit-maximizing firm 
may choose to leave it even if the execution of the project is essential 
to the national interest. This may be an example of a classic “adverse 
selection” problem. 
c) The successful use of the “responsibility principle” in 
conjunction with fixed-price contracts in France is unlikely to be 
replicated in the U.S. due to the institutional differences existing 
between the two countries. 
The function of the “responsibility principle” is built on the nature of 
French state, i.e., a strong control of the defense firms by the state, 
the cozy relation between the firm and the state, the extremely 
powerful DGA and the relative weak role of the Parliament and the 
public.  At least formally and officially, none of the above is true in the 
U.S. 
ON WHAT WE CAN LEARN 
a) One lesson we can learn from French is to make an effort to 
reduce the information asymmetry and associated agency problem 
that give arise to cost overruns.  
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At the center of this issue is how to improve the quality of acquisition 
work force. The huge talent gap between the U.S. and French 
contracting agencies is certainly a major issue that should be 
addressed seriously.  We do not expect this issue can be resolved 
overnight due to many institutional and historical factors such as the 
pay gap between the private sector and the public sector in the U.S. 
Yet actions need to be called upon from the top to improve the quality 
of acquisition work force.  The newly passed Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) has exerted some effort along the 
organization line. However, more needs to be done. 
b) Another useful implication of the French system is to increase 
the use of multiyear contracts in the U.S. major weapon programs. 
Shortly after the French Parliament approved a defense budget that 
provides for spending of EUR 185 billion over 2009-2014, the DGA 
on December 31, 2009 awarded Dassault Aviation a multi-billion 
euro, multi-year production contract to deliver 60 Rafale F3 combat 
aircraft. This contract provides an excellent illustration of how DGA’s 
power of allocation can ensure multiyear funding for high-priority 
weapons systems even within a shrinking defense budget, a task that 
is very difficult, if not impossible, in the United States. 
The rare use of multiyear contracts3 in the U.S. has a lot to do with 
the power of Congress. In contrast to the French case, where the 
Parliament votes only on an overall 6-year spending envelope rather 
than individual weapon systems, the U.S. Congress micromanages 
individual programs and has ultimate authority in approving, revising, 
and terminating programs. Moreover, in the U.S. annual contracting is 
the norm. Multiyear contracting requires special congressional 
authority and review on a program-by-program basis. The statutory 
criteria for a multiyear procurement require that a candidate program 
make realistic cost estimates, expect to achieve substantial savings, 
and provide adequate evidence that the program is stable in terms of 
funding, requirements, and design. 
                                                          
3 According to GAO-08-298, DoD spends about 10 billion annually on multi-
year procurement. So the vast majority of repeated contracting takes the 
form of multiple annual contracts.  
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Despite the fact that it is very difficult to change the status quo, at 
least three benefits warrant the serious consideration of promoting 
greater use of multiyear contracts. 
First, multiyear contracts reduce costs through alleviating the hold-up 
problem. The basic idea is that firms can produce more cheaply if 
they produce them in larger “batches”. By committing to a larger 
order that is not subject to change every year, the government gives 
the contracting firms right incentive to engage in efficient production. 
Second, the multiyear commitment provides both assurance to the 
supply chain and confidence to the potential export customers. The 
presence or absence of both assurance and confidence will likely 
affect overall schedules and delivery dates. 
Last but not least, Rogerson (1994) proposed a “Regulatory Lag” 
theory to explain why multiyear contracting might be advantageous to 
DoD. In the current situation of the repeated contracting relationship 
which is characterized by a series of annual contracts, the nature of 
non-commitment gives arise to the following “ratchet effect”. If the 
firm truthfully reveals their private information and in turn exert effort 
to reduce the cost (i.e., the firm performs well) early in the 
relationship, the government will use that cost information in the next 
period contracting and leaves no benefit to the firm. Hence the firm 
has incentive to retain information and not be overly efficient. Stated 
differently, the contractor’s actual ability to perform is concealed. If 
the contractor’s actual ability to perform is never revealed, then the 
benefit of a repeated game, which is the gradual elimination of 
information asymmetry, goes away. On the other hand, if the 
government wants to correct for the fear of a ratchet effect, the 
government has to offer a very generous reward for ethical and 
efficient behavior. The offer may create a reverse incentive problem: 
only this time it is the unethical and inefficient firm, tempted by the 
generous reward, that wants to mimic the efficient organization 
temporarily (because it is infeasible for them to mimic permanently) 
and then quit the relationship. This is called the “take-the-money-and-
run” strategy. Rogerson (1994) realized this problem and called for 
more use of multiyear contracting. He argued that “multiyear 
contracting has been both underused and misused”. In particular, 
under his “Regulatory Lag” proposal, “DoD essentially makes the 
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following bargain with the firm. In return for revealing its ability to 
lower costs, DoD will let the firm keep the benefits for the duration of 
the multiyear in which costs are lowered. However, on subsequent 
contracts, DoD will take the benefits itself.”  
One might argue that information asymmetry can be addressed by 
the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA, 1987). Under TINA, defense 
contractors must submit detailed “current accurate and complete” 
cost estimates when they negotiate the price of a contract with DoD. 
A violation of TINA would impose significant litigation risk to the firm. 
However, as argued by Rogerson (1994), “TINA cannot force defense 
contractors to reveal the lowest possible cost that they could produce 
at if they exerted an optimal effort. Rather, it essentially tells them 
that the price they negotiate must be close to the cost they actually 
incur. In this way, it converts a fixed price contract into something 
much more closely resembling a cost reimbursement contract. From 
an economic point of view, stricter enforcement of TINA is by no 
means unambiguously better than lax enforcement. It may be that in 
some cases, weakening TINA would, by removing the risk of 
prosecution, encourage firms to seek out additional ways of lowering 
costs, which would then benefit the government in future contracts.” 
 
ON WHAT WE CAN DO DIFFERENT 
a) Following the logic that a complete migration from cost-plus 
contracts to fixed-price contracts in the U.S. is not optimal, a better 
design of cost-plus contracts is needed to address the cost overrun 
problems. 
Although cost-plus contracts are often maligned as not cost-effective, 
this type of contract has certain advantages over fixed-price contracts 
in DoD’s major defense acquisition programs.  In addition to 
traditional risk-sharing benefits, Wang and San Miguel (2011) argue 
that, if properly designed, a cost-plus contract mitigates the agency 
problem which underlies the disadvantages associated with 
conventional cost-plus contracting methods.  Specifically, a “budget-
based cost-plus scheme” is introduced for demonstrating that the 
contracting firm will voluntarily and truthfully reveal the contractor’s 
unbiased prior beliefs about the projected cost.  This reduces both 
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information asymmetry between DoD and the contractor and abuse 
to the system that arises from the agency problem (the conflict of 
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